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Abstract
We reexamine the relationship between school quality and house prices and ﬁnd it to be nonlinear.
Unlike most studies in the literature, we ﬁnd that the price premium parents must pay to buy a house
associatedwithabetterschoolincreasesasschoolqualityincreases. Thisistrueevenaftercontrollingfor
neighborhood characteristics, such as the racial composition of neighborhoods, which is also capitalized
into house prices. In contrast with previous studies that use the boundary discontinuity approach, we ﬁnd
that the price premium from school quality remains substantially large, particulary for neighborhoods
associated with high-quality schools. [JEL: C21, I20, R21]
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11 Introduction
Since the pioneering work of Tiebout (1956), economists have recognized that the quality of public services,
especially schools, inﬂuences house prices. The relationship between house prices and public school quality
has been widely studied in the literature, dating back to Oates’ (1969) seminal paper. In the analysis of
school quality, researchers have often applied the hedonic pricing model developed by Rosen (1974).1 In
that model, the implicit price of a house is a function of its comparable characteristics, as well as measures
of school quality and a set of neighborhood characteristics. Examples of this approach include Haurin and
Brasington (1996), Bogart and Cromwell (1997), Hayes and Taylor (1996), Weimer and Wolkoff (2001), and
Cheshire and Sheppard (2002). The estimated coefﬁcients from the regression represent the capitalization
of these components into house values.2
A prevalent concern of capitalization studies is the possibility of omitted variable bias, induced by failing
to account for the correlation between school quality and unobserved neighborhood characteristics, as better
schools tend to be located in better neighborhoods. Black (1999) circumvented this problem by restricting
the sample to examine only houses near the boundaries between school attendance zones and controlling for
neighborhood characteristics with boundary ﬁxed effects in several large Boston suburbs.3 She rationalized
that, whereas school quality measures such as standardized test scores make a discrete jump at the boundary,
neighborhood characteristics change more smoothly. Some authors are also concerned about the potential
endogeneity of school quality when it is measured by indicators of student performance.4
The hedonic approach, including Black’s (1999) variation, often speciﬁes a linear relationship between
the measure of school quality and the natural logarithm of house prices.5 The linear speciﬁcation, however,
presupposes that the marginal valuation of low-quality schools is equal to the valuation of high-quality
schools and results in a constant premium on school quality.
In this paper, we argue that the relationship between school quality and house prices in the boundary
discontinuityframeworkisbettercharacterizedasanonlinearrelationship. Wetestfornonlineareffectsfrom
1Sheppard (1999) provides a survey of the literature of hedonic models of housing markets.
2Ross and Yinger (1999) and Gibbons and Machin (2008) provide surveys of the capitalization literature.
3A rudimentary precursor of this idea was analyzed by Gill (1983), who studied a sample of houses in Columbus, Ohio,
restricting observations to neighborhoods with similar characteristics. More to the point, Cushing (1984) analyzed house price
differentials between adjacent blocks at the border of two jurisdictions in the Detroit, Michigan, metropolitan area.
4Gibbons and Machin (2003), for example, argue that better school performance in neighborhoods with high house prices may
reﬂect that wealthy parents buy bigger houses with more amenities and therefore devote more resources to their children.
5Nonlinear effects are, however, routinely allowed among some house characteristics, such as the number of bathrooms and the
age of the building.
2school quality measured with standardized test scores for elementary schools in the St. Louis, Missouri,
metropolitan area.6
To the best of our knowledge, nonlinear hedonics from school quality have been explored only by
Cheshire and Sheppard (2004) in a study of primary and secondary schools in the United Kingdom. The
authors estimate a full-sample, standard hedonic regression modiﬁed to include Box-Cox transformations
of house prices, house characteristics, and measures of school quality. Their evidence suggests that the
price-quality relationship is highly nonlinear.
We argue that the nonlinearity with respect to school quality illustrates two aspects of the market for
public education that are reﬂected in the housing market.7 First, in an environment in which potential buyers
are heterogeneous in the intensity of their preferences for school quality and neighborhood characteristics,
buyers with a stronger preference for education quality may concentrate their buying search for a house
in the highest-quality attendance zones.8 As school quality increases, competition from other buyers would
create an increasingly tight housing market, because the housing supply in these areas is often very inelastic,
as most metropolitan areas have a ﬁxed housing stock in the short run.9 Second, alternative schooling
arrangements (e.g., private schools, home school, magnet schools) can provide home buyers with high-
quality education even if they choose to live in lower-quality public school attendance zones, allowing for
a reduced price premium in these neighborhoods. The existence of these options underlies our belief that a
constant premium across the range of school quality is not realistic.
The above arguments rely on the heterogeneity of preferences for school quality and neighborhood
characteristics among the population of prospective home buyers, a feature that has been widely documented
in the literature. Bayer, Ferreira, and McMillan (2007), for example, argue that there is a considerable degree
of heterogeneity in homeowners’ preferences for schools and racial composition of neighborhoods.
6A previous study by Ridker and Henning (1967) found no evidence of education capitalization in St. Louis house prices.
Although their main concern was to determine the negative effect of air pollution on housing prices, they included a dummy
variable that indicated residents’ attitudes about the quality of the schools (above average, average, and below average). Ridker
and Henning acknowledge that their study may suffer from small-sample bias that could explain this seemingly contradictory
ﬁnding. Kain and Quigley (1970) is an early study analyzing the components of a hedonic price index for housing in the St. Louis
metropolitan area, but it does not consider measures of school quality.
7This argument can be motivated with a search model of the housing market in the spirit of Wheaton (1990) and Williams
(1995).
8A school’s attendance zone delimits the geographic area around the school the residents’ children would attend. A school
district is an administrative unit in the public-school system often comprising several schools.
9ThisargumentissimilartothatproposedbyHilberandMayer(2009). Theyarguethatscarcityoflandconfoundsidentiﬁcation
of the education premium. Brasington (2002) and Hilber and Mayer (2009) have also noted that the extent of capitalization in a
hedonic framework may vary depending on whether houses are located near the interior or the edge of an urban area. They ﬁnd that
capitalization is weaker toward the edge, where housing supply elasticities and developer activity are greater.
3An alternative hypothesis that can generate nonlinearities is that school quality can be considered a
luxury good, and therefore, at higher-quality schools (and therefore richer neighborhoods), people would be
willing to pay more for the same marginal increase in school quality.10
Studies in the literature often differ in terms of the level of geographic detail at which school quality is
measured: at the school-district level or at the school level. Many papers that do not use the boundary dis-
continuity approach measure education quality at the school-district level, as opposed to considering schools
individually. These studies also face the challenge of devising appropriate deﬁnitions of neighborhoods to
match the geographic level at which school quality is measured. In our paper, we measure school quality at
the individual school level. We also use Census blocks (as opposed to the larger block groups or tracts) to
measure neighborhood demographics.
The boundary discontinuity approach has received some criticism in recent works, motivated primarily
by the concern about removal of any remaining omitted spatial ﬁxed effects (Cheshire and Sheppard, 2004),
or the possibility of discontinuous changes in neighborhood characteristics, which also depends on the deﬁ-
nition of neighborhood that is adopted (Kane, Riegg, and Staiger, 2003; and Bayer, Ferreira, and McMillan,
2007). However, barring the availability of repeat sales data or information on boundary redistricting or
policy changes to supply the exogenous variation required for identiﬁcation, in the case of stable boundary
deﬁnitions and cross-sectional data, the boundary discontinuity approach remains a useful methodology.
In this paper, we use Black’s (1999) method of considering only houses located near attendance zone
boundaries and regressing house prices on physical characteristics of houses and a full set of pairwise
boundary dummies to control for unobserved neighborhood characteristics. Additionally, in response to
the criticisms of the boundary discontinuity approach, we augment the estimation by controlling for a set of
demographic characteristics deﬁned at the Census-block level.
We ﬁnd, as did Black (1999), that controlling for unobserved neighborhood characteristics with bound-
ary ﬁxed effects reduces the premium estimates from test scores relative to the hedonic regression with the
full sample of observations. We also ﬁnd, however, that the linear speciﬁcation for test scores underestimates
the premium at high levels of school quality and overestimates the premium at low levels of school quality.
In contrast to Black (1999) and many subsequent studies in the literature, we ﬁnd that the effects of school
quality on housing prices remain substantially large even after controlling for neighborhood demographics
and boundary ﬁxed effects. We also ﬁnd that the racial composition of neighborhoods has a statistically
10We thank an anonymous referee for this suggestion.
4signiﬁcant effect on house prices.
This paper is organized as follows. Section 2 describes the econometric methodology used to estimate
the model. Section 3 describes our data. Section 4 presents the empirical results, and Section 5 concludes.
2 Econometric Methodology
Our intention is to estimate the value that higher school performance adds to house prices. Speciﬁcally,
we are interested in estimating the dollar value difference in home prices for a quantiﬁed increase in school
quality. We discuss three alternative speciﬁcations that include two different identiﬁcation techniques to
disentangle neighborhood quality from school quality.
2.1 Pure hedonic pricing model
As a benchmark, we introduce a hedonic pricing equation in which the sale price is described as a function
of the characteristics of the house and its location-speciﬁc attributes, including the quality of the school
associated with it. The basic hedonic function can be described as follows:
ln(piaj) =  + Xi
0 + Zj
0 + a H + iaj; (1)
where piaj is the price of house i in attendance zone a in neighborhood j. The vector Xi represents
the comparable aspects of house i (i.e., the number of bedrooms, bathrooms, and so on) and vector Zj
represents local characteristics. The value a is the quality of the school in attendance zone a. In this
paper, we measure school quality with an index constructed from test scores, deﬁned at the school level and
expressedinstandarddeviationsfromthemean.11 Thequantityofinterest H istheeducationcapitalization
premium and represents the percentage increment in house prices from increasing school test scores by 1
standard deviation.
11Various studies in the hedonic analysis tradition have used input-based measures of education quality, such as per-pupil spend-
ing. Hanushek (1986, 1997) found that school inputs have no apparent impact on student achievement and are therefore inappropri-
ate as measures of school quality. The research on education production functions also makes the case that value-added measures
of achievement–the marginal improvement in a particular cohort’s performance over a period of time–would be more appropriate
as measures of quality in capitalization studies. However, constructing value-added measures requires tracking groups of students
over time and implies more sophistication in the decision making process of potential buyers, as value-added measures are not read-
ily available to the public. Brasington (1999), Downes and Zabel (2002), and Brasington and Haurin (2006) found little support
for using value-added school quality measures in the capitalization model; they argue that home buyers favor, in contrast, more
traditional measures of school quality in their housing valuations.
5Thus, the house price reﬂects all relevant attributes; that is, physical and location-speciﬁc characteristics
of the home are capitalized into the house value even if they are not directly consumable by the current
tenants (because of their effects on the resale value of the house).12 One potential problem with this
speciﬁcation is that the comparable house characteristics, Xi, do not fully capture the quality of the house
(updates, condition, landscaping, layout, and so on), the quality of the surrounding neighborhood, and
various other factors. The hedonic pricing function attempts to capture these factors with the inclusion of
the Zj vector. The success with which the model captures these unobserved factors often depends on how
coarsely the geographic area encompassed by Zj is deﬁned (i.e., for how small a vicinity around the house
Zj provides variation).
2.2 Linear boundary ﬁxed effects model
The methodology of adding the location characteristics vector, Zj, may reduce but not entirely account
for all of the variation that can be introduced on a neighborhood level. Suppose that the neighborhood
characteristics gradient is large in absolute value. This implies that houses a few blocks away from each
other can vary a great deal in atmosphere and, therefore, in price. This variation can by related to distance
to amenities, mass transit, and thoroughfares (i.e., highway access), proximity to commercial and industrial
zoning, single-family housing density, and so on. The vector Zj may be unable to account for all the
unobserved neighborhood variation that confounds the estimate of the capitalization premium because of
the potential correlation with school quality. As Black (1999) points out, much of this variation (though
admittedly not all) can be corrected for by analyzing houses that are geographically close.
The boundary discontinuities reﬁnement considers only those houses that are geographically close to
school attendance zone boundaries and replaces the vector of local characteristics with a full set of pair-
wise boundary dummies.13 Each house in this reduced sample is associated with the nearest, and hence
unique, attendance zone boundary. This yields
ln(piab) =  + Xi
0 + Kb
0 + a L + iab; (2)
where Kb is the vector of boundary dummies and the subscript b indexes the set of boundaries. The resulting
12For example, if the current tenants have no school-aged children.
13Clapp, Nanda, and Ross (2008), in contrast, measure school quality at the school-district level and use Census-tract ﬁxed effects
to control for omitted neighborhood characteristics. Brasington and Haurin (2006) also measure school quality at the school-district
level but use spatial statistics rather than ﬁxed effects to control for neighborhood characteristics.
6education premium calculated with the linear boundary ﬁxed effects model is  L. Equation (2), then,
is equivalent to calculating differences in house prices on opposite sides of attendance boundaries while
controlling for house characteristics and relating the premium to test score information.
The boundary dummies allow us to account for unobserved neighborhood characteristics of houses on
either side of an attendance boundary because two homes next to each other generally would have the same
atmosphere. For this approach to be successful, particular care must be taken to exclude from the sample
attendance zones whose boundaries coincide with administrative boundaries, rivers, parks, highways, or
other landmarks that clearly divide neighborhoods, as neighborhood characteristics in these cases would be
expected to vary discontinuously at the boundary.14
2.3 Nonlinear boundary ﬁxed effects models
As an alternative to the linear model outlined in the previous section, we consider the possibility that the
capitalization premium is not constant over the range of school qualities. This is accomplished by testing
whether the education capitalization term enters nonlinearly. Consider the following pricing equation:
ln(piab) =  + Xi
0 + Kb
0 + f(a) + iab; (3)
where f(a) represents a potentially nonlinear function of school quality. For simplicity, suppose the
functionf(a)iscomposedofalinearpolynomialtermandhigher-orderpolynomialtermsinschoolquality.
That is,
f(a) =  1a +  22
a +  33
a (4)
where  m, m = 1;2;3, are scalar parameters. We then rewrite equation (3) as
ln(piab) =  + Xi
0 + Kb
0 +  1a +  22
a +  33
a + iab: (5)
Speciﬁcation (5) has a number of advantages over the linear form (2). First, the rate at which the
14In addition to boundary discontinuities (Leech and Campos, 2003; Kane, Staiger, and Samms, 2003; Kane, Staiger, and
Riegg, 2005; Gibbons and Machin, 2003, 2006; Fack and Grenet, 2007; Davidoff and Leigh, 2007) recent studies have used
various methods of addressing the omitted variables and endogeneity issues, including time variation (Bogart and Cromwell, 2000;
Downes and Zabel, 2002; Figlio and Lucas, 2004; and Reback, 2005, among others), natural experiments (Bogart and Cromwell,
2000; Kane, Staiger, and Riegg, 2005), spatial statistics (Gibbons and Machin, 2003; Brasington and Haurin, 2006), or instrumental
variables (Rosenthal, 2003; Bayer, Ferreira, and McMillan, 2007).
7nominal premium varies across the range of school quality is not ﬁxed. This allows us to differentiate
the incremental effects on house prices of low- versus high-quality school attendance zones. Second, with
a constant premium the linear model penalizes houses in low-quality school attendance zones by valuing
them below what would be predicted by their comparable attributes.15 Moreover, the penalty increases as
the school quality worsens. This is unappealing because, as mentioned in the introduction, potential buyers
who value education quality often can ﬁnd substitute arrangements outside the public school system. Our
prediction is that houses in lower-quality attendance zones command a smaller premium; in other words, the
price function should be ﬂatter for areas with lower test scores and steeper for those with higher test scores.
This possibility is explicitly excluded in the linear model.
2.4 A note on the estimation
We estimated regression equations (1), (2), and (5) with ordinary least squares. In all cases, we computed
robust standard errors clustered at the school level. For completeness, the Results section also presents the
estimation of the nonlinear models using the full sample. We included boundary dummies in the regression
equation and estimated the coefﬁcients for these variables directly.
In an attempt to reduce any remaining bias from omitted characteristics, some recent studies, such as
Bayer, Ferreira, and McMillan (2007), have supplemented their analysis by including demographic controls
in the regressions. We therefore present results of the boundary ﬁxed effects regressions in which the
vector Zj of neighborhood characteristics has been reinserted in the estimation. In particular, we control
for the racial composition of neighborhoods. Studies that speciﬁcally consider the racial composition of
neighborhoods include Bogart and Cromwell (2000); Downes and Zabel (2002); Cheshire and Sheppard
(2004); Kane, Staiger, and Riegg (2005); Reback (2005); Clapp, Nanda, and Ross (2007); and Bayer,
Ferreira, and McMillan (2007).
3 Data
In this analysis, we restrict our attention tosingle-family residences and elementary schoolattendance zones.
Each observation corresponds to a house and is described by variables reﬂecting its physical characteristics,
15We adopt the convention that an increase in school quality induces a premium on house prices, whereas a decrease in school
quality imposes a penalty on house prices.
8the quality of the local elementary school that children in the household would attend, and the character-
istics of the neighborhood in which the house is located—namely, demographic indicators measured at the
Census-block level and property tax rates measured at the school-district level.
3.1 Real estate prices and housing characteristics
We obtained house price and house characteristics data from First American Real Estate, Inc. The obser-
vations selected correspond to a cross section of single-family residences sold during the 1998-2001 period
in the St. Louis, Missouri, metropolitan area. After eliminating from the original dataset observations with
missing or outlier house prices (outside a bound of 3.5 standard deviations from the mean unadjusted house
price), our sample includes 38,656 single-family residences.
Wedeﬂatedhousepricesto1998dollarswiththeOfﬁceofFederalHousingEnterpriseOversightrepeat-
sales price index for the entire St. Louis metropolitan area.16 In the full sample the resulting adjusted house
price has a mean of $148,082 and a standard deviation of $161,397. House characteristics include the total
number of rooms, number of bedrooms, number of bathrooms, lot size, internal square footage, age of the
structure, and number of stories in the house.
3.2 Attendance zones
For the boundary discontinuity analysis, we obtained the deﬁnitions of 121 attendance zones for elementary
schools in 15 school districts in St. Louis County. Most of these were obtained by contacting the school
districts directly. Boundaries were variously provided as listings of streets, maps, and in some isolated cases
as geo-coded ﬁles. We, in turn, geo-coded all the attendance zones and determined the boundary for every
pair of adjacent schools, as in Black (1999). We also geo-coded each house in our sample using the street
address. We then selected houses within a 0.1-mile buffer of the boundaries and assigned them to the nearest
(and therefore unique) pair-wise boundary.17 We also eliminated from the boundary sample observations
in St. Louis County that were associated with the boundaries of St. Louis City schools because we have
no house price observations for the city. The ﬁnal boundary sample consisted of 10,190 single-family
residences.
16House prices were deﬂated using the average price index corresponding to the quarter of sale. The results were qualitatively
unaffected if the National Association of Realtors price index was used instead.
17Black considers a number of different boundary width ranges and ﬁnds no signiﬁcant differences. Our sample does not permit
wider boundaries as these would encompass some attendance zones almost entirely.
93.3 Neighborhood characteristics
Houses were also matched to Census blocks as the geographic unit at which we measured neighborhood
demographics. We used the publicly available population tables at the block level from the Census 2000
SummaryFile1, whichincludescountsbyage, sex, andrace, toconstructthefollowingmeasures: percentof
females, percent of school-aged children (aged between 5 and 14 years), and percent of nonwhite population
(deﬁned as the total population count minus the count of white people).
Additionally, we include as neighborhood controls the property tax rates deﬁned at the school-district
level for the years 1998 through 2001. In this case, each house was matched to the tax rate prevailing during
the year of sale in its associated school district.18 Table 1 presents summary statistics for house prices and
characteristics with neighborhood characteristics for both the full and boundary samples.
3.4 Test scores
As the measure of school quality we use a school-level index generated by the Missouri Department of
Elementary and Secondary Education. This index is computed from test score data from the Missouri
Assessment Program (MAP). The MAP test includes a Mathematics section, a Communication Arts section
(which includes a Reading portion), a Science section, and a Social Studies section.
Neither individual student scores nor school-level averages of these scores are publicly available. In-
stead, for each content area, the publicly available data provide the overall school-level MAP index. This
index is obtained with a state-deﬁned formula as the weighted sum of the percentages of students in each
of ﬁve performance categories (Advanced, Proﬁcient, Nearing Proﬁcient, Progressing, and Step 1). The
formula is MAP index = (percent in Step1)*1 + (percent in Progressing)*1.5 + (percent in Nearing Proﬁ-
cient)*2 + (percent in Proﬁcient)*2.5 + (percent in Advanced)*3. The weights are exogenously determined
by the Missouri Department of Elementary and Secondary Education.19
For our study we chose the Math MAP index for elementary schools only (fourth grade) as our measure
of school quality.20 This measure was then averaged over the period 1998-2001 to remove any year-to-year
noise in the component variables (as in Bayer, Ferreira, and McMillan, 2007). Because our housing data are
18The analysis was not affected qualitatively if an average over the period was used instead.
19This formula was updated in 2007 when the number of performance categories was reduced to 4.
20We consider the math score a measure of school quality superior to the reading or science measures. First, the math scores are
arguably the more objective measure. Second, the distribution of the school Math MAP index among the schools was contained
almost entirely within two standard deviations of the mean. In contrast, the reading and science indexes contained a large number
of outliers, particularly in the lower tail. We did not consider the social sciences scores.
10essentially cross sectional, this procedure provides one consistent score for each school in the sample.
Table 2 presents summary statistics for MAP indexes along with property tax rates among the schools
and school districts included in the sample.
[Table 1 about here.]
[Table 2 about here.]
4 Empirical Results
4.1 Standard hedonic regression
Table 3 presents the regression results using the full sample, which includes neighborhood demographic
controls but excludes, of course, the boundary ﬁxed effects. In addition to the traditional linear model, we
have included the quadratic and cubic speciﬁcations in test scores for completeness.
We ﬁnd that housing characteristics enter the pricing equation with the expected sign. Increases in
living area, lot size, and the total number of rooms increase the price of a house on average. Similarly,
the number of bathrooms and the number of stories have a positive and statistically signiﬁcant effect. The
number of bedrooms, the number of bathrooms squared, the age of the building, and its square do not seem
to have a statistically signiﬁcant effect in the full sample.
Among the neighborhood demographics only the percent of the nonwhite population (measured at the
block level) is capitalized into house prices with a negative and statistically signiﬁcant effect. The estimated
coefﬁcients indicate that an increase of 1 percentage point in the proportion of the nonwhite population
decreases house prices by about 22 (in the linear model) to 27 (in the quadratic model) basis points. The
property tax rate does not have a statistically signiﬁcant effect.
As expected, the regressions illustrate a strong relation between school quality and house prices. The
coefﬁcient of 0.21734 in the traditional linear model (1) reveals that an increase in school test scores of
half a standard deviation results in a house premium of about 11 percent (0.21734/2 = 10.867%) or about
$16,000 at the mean price. A half standard deviation increase is equivalent to an increase of 4.6 percent in
the Math MAP index.
The quadratic and cubic models in columns 2 and 3, respectively, also indicate a large and positive
linear coefﬁcient of school quality on house prices. The coefﬁcient for the square of the Math score is,
11however, not statistically signiﬁcant in columns 2 and 3. Interestingly, the cubic coefﬁcient in column 3
is statistically signiﬁcant, but it enters with a negative sign, which indicates that the house price premium
does not monotonically increase over the range of school quality. In any case, these models suggest that
nonlinearities are relevant. This is conﬁrmed by a battery of Wald speciﬁcation tests (Table 4). These tests
reject the null hypothesis of a model with a constant education premium. We ﬁnd that the restriction of not
including a quadratic or cubic term ( 2 =  3 = 0) is rejected at the 1 percent level, while not including a
cubic term ( 3 = 0) is rejected at the 5 percent level. However, the restriction of no quadratic term ( 2 = 0)
is not rejected. Thus, we ﬁnd evidence that the preferred speciﬁcation for the education premium in the full
sample is the cubic model.
[Table 3 about here.]
[Table 4 about here.]
4.2 Boundary discontinuity models
Table 5 presents the results for the restricted boundary sample (omitting the estimated coefﬁcient for the
boundary ﬁxed effects). As in the full sample, house characteristics are statistically signiﬁcant and with the
expected sign. In contrast to the full sample results, the age of the building and its square, along with the
square of the number of bathrooms, are statistically signiﬁcant. Compared with the full sample results, the
estimatedcoefﬁcientsforhousecharacteristicsaresmallerinmagnitudebutverystableacrossspeciﬁcations.
In the linear model in column 1, school quality is a statistically signiﬁcant contributor to house prices
and enters with the expected positive sign. Compared with the results from the full sample regression, the
estimated coefﬁcient declines in magnitude by a factor of about four. The estimate of the education premium
implies that a half standard deviation increase in the average school score leads to an increase of about 3.2
percent in house prices, or about $4,766 evaluated at the full sample mean price. This value is only slightly
higher than that estimated by Black (1999).21
[Table 5 about here.]
The two speciﬁcations of the nonlinear boundary ﬁxed effects models in columns 2 and 3 indicate
that the quadratic coefﬁcient of school quality is statistically signiﬁcant, but the cubic coefﬁcient is not. The
21Black reports a 2.1 percent increase (or $3,948 at her sample mean) in house prices for a 5 percent increase in test scores.
12positive sign of the quadratic coefﬁcient indicates that the capitalization effect of school quality is increasing
over the range of test scores.
Speciﬁcations 1, 2, and 3 do not include additional controls for neighborhood quality other than the
boundary ﬁxed effects. As mentioned previously, some authors have raised concerns about whether the
boundary discontinuity approach fails to control for omitted neighborhood characteristics and suggest that
explicit additional controls be included in the estimation. We therefore include the same demographic
controls as in the full sample regression—namely, the percent of female population, the percent of nonwhite
population, and the percent of school-aged children, all measured at the block level. We also include the
school district property tax rate.
Columns 4, 5, and 6 in Table 5 show that these additional variables are directly capitalized into house
prices. The percent of nonwhite population is statistically signiﬁcant and enters with a negative sign as in the
full sample results. The magnitude of the effect is similar to the full sample results and indicates a decline
of about 22 basis points in house prices for a 1-percentage-point increase in the proportion of the nonwhite
population. We interpret the signiﬁcance of this variable, as in other papers, as evidence of preferences
about the racial composition of neighborhoods.
In contrast to the full sample results, the percent of school-aged children is statistically signiﬁcant and
indicates an increase in house prices of about 15 basis points for a 1-percentage-point increase in the pro-
portion of children aged between 5 and 14 years. The property tax rate is also statistically signiﬁcant and
enters with a negative sign.
The inclusion of explicit neighborhood controls does not affect the magnitude of the coefﬁcients of the
housing characteristics, but it decreases the magnitude of the linear test score coefﬁcient by almost half. The
quadratic coefﬁcient declines only slightly. The linear coefﬁcient on school quality remains, nevertheless,
statistically signiﬁcant and the results suggest that the magnitude of the effect of school quality on house
prices remains substantially large.
Wald speciﬁcation tests (Table 6) conﬁrm that with or without the inclusion of additional neighborhood
controls, the preferred speciﬁcation is the quadratic model. These tests also reject, as in the full sample
regressions, the null hypothesis of a model with a constant education premium. We ﬁnd that the restriction
of not including a quadratic or cubic term ( 2 =  3 = 0) is rejected at the 5 percent level. However, the
restriction of no cubic term ( 3 = 0) is not rejected.
13[Table 6 about here.]
4.3 Implicit housing premia
Figure 1 illustrates the preferred speciﬁcation for the house pricing function with the more conservative
model with boundary ﬁxed effects resulting from the inclusion of additional neighborhood controls. The
plot includes one-standard-error bands.22
We argued in the introduction that competition in the housing market generates increasing tightness in
areas associated with higher school quality, but that competition is not as prevalent in areas associated with
lower school quality. The pricing function in Figure 1 conﬁrms our argument.
The premium from school quality on housing prices is better illustrated in Figure 2. This ﬁgure is
constructed from the pricing function of speciﬁcation 5 in Table 5 and represents the percentage increase in
house prices in response to a half a standard deviation increase in Math test scores plotted along the range
of school scores contained within two standard deviations of the mean.
The plotted function reveals a monotonically increasing premium across the spectrum of school quality.
The plot indicates that, even when using the most conservative estimates, the premium for houses in areas
associated with high-quality schools remains substantially large. The plot also reveals a much smaller
premium for houses in areas associated with low-quality schools, where house prices seem to be driven
almost entirely by housing and neighborhood characteristics other than public school quality.
[Figure 1 about here.]
[Figure 2 about here.]
Table 7 summarizes the implied school quality premia for all models and provides the dollar equivalent
of the implied percentage increase in house prices relative to the mean house prices in the full and boundary
samples that results from a half standard deviation increase in test scores.
[Table 7 about here.]
The linear model with the full sample regression results in a constant premium of 10.87 percent or
about $16,000 at the mean house price. The cubic model in the full sample, which the speciﬁcation tests






14suggest is the preferred one, illustrates a nonmonotonic premium that ranges from 11.53 percent for houses
in areas where school quality is one standard deviation below the mean to 15.78 percent in areas where
school quality coincides with the average, and ﬁnally to 9.23 percent in areas where school quality is one
standard deviation above the mean.
The boundary sample models with and without additional neighborhood controls indicate that the pre-
mium is severely overestimated in the traditional hedonic regressions, even accounting for nonlinearities.
Nevertheless, even in the most conservative estimates, the premium remains substantially large especially
for areas associated with very high-quality schools. The table also shows that in the quadratic speciﬁcation
(the middle column of the the third panel in Table 7), the premium is very small (about 0.13 percent or
less than $200) in areas where test scores are one standard deviation below the mean, and monotonically
increases in areas with higher test scores (about 2.34 percent or $3,468 in areas with average test scores, and
4.55 percent or $6,739 in areas with test scores at one standard deviation above the mean).
5 Conclusion
Traditional empirical models of the capitalization of education quality on house prices have established that
the quality of primary school education is positively correlated with house prices.
Recent capitalization studies have dealt in various ways with concerns about omitted variable bias in-
duced by failing to account for the correlation between school quality and unobserved neighborhood charac-
teristics, Most of these variations on the traditional hedonic approach (including the boundary discontinuity
regression) have made, however, similar assumptions on the shape of the house pricing premium over school
quality: The rate at which the premium increases is restricted to be constant because in all these models the
contribution from school quality on house prices is constrained to be linear.
In this paper, we propose an alternative formulation that allows for nonlinear effects of school quality.
We show that this formulation is preferred by the data over a baseline linear boundary ﬁxed effects model
and that the rate at which the house price premium rises increases over the range of school quality. In other
words, we ﬁnd that the standard linear speciﬁcation for test scores overestimates the premium at low levels
of school quality and underestimates the premium at high levels of school quality.
In the St. Louis metropolitan area, houses associated with a school ranked at one standard deviation
below the mean are essentially priced on physical characteristics only. In contrast, houses associated with
15higher-quality schools command a much higher price premium.
Interestingly, and in contrast to many studies in the literature, the price premium remains substantially
large, especially for houses associated with above-average schools. This is true even in our most con-
servative estimates, which complement the boundary discontinuity approach by explicitly controlling for
neighborhood demographics. These estimates also reveal that the racial composition of neighborhoods is
capitalized directly into house prices.
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19Figure 1: Implied Price Function
20Figure 2: Implied Premium Function (to an increase in 0.5 s.d. in test scores)
21Table 1: Summary Statistics: House and Neighborhood Characteristics
Full sample (N=38656) Boundary sample (N=10190)
House variables Mean SD Mean SD
Sale price (1998 US$) 148,081.67 161,397.24 142,033.42 176,191.20
Log of sale price 11.62 0.73 11.56 0.75
Number of bedrooms 2.96 0.84 2.9 0.84
Number of bathrooms 2.01 0.95 1.95 0.93
Number of bathrooms (squared) 4.97 5.05 4.66 5.04
Age of building 38.91 20.63 40.72 21.27
Age of building (squared) 1,939.38 1,922.87 2,110.15 2,028.41
Lot area (1000s of sq. ft.) 14.75 38.35 13.61 39.20
Living area (1000s of sq. ft.) 1.16 0.44 1.13 0.42
Number of stories 1.24 0.42 1.23 0.41
Total number of rooms 6.38 1.60 6.26 1.57
Full sample (N=6360 blocks) Boundary sample (N=2560 blocks)
Census variables Mean SD Mean SD
Percent female population 51.17 11.22 51.34 11.33
Percent nonwhite population 20.43 29.29 22.42 30.67
Percent population aged 5 to 14 9.34 9.58 9.98 9.38
22Table 2: Summary Statistics: Test Scores and Property Tax
Test scores (N=121 schools)
Variable Mean SD Min. Max.
Math MAP score 211.45 19.44 168.14 250.18
Science MAP score 211.88 22.56 100.00 242.61
Reading MAP score 200.73 20.15 100.00 228.94
Property tax (N=15 school districts)
Variable Mean SD Min. Max.
Property tax rate ($1/$1,000 4.23 0.91 2.60 5.74
of assessed house value)
23Table 3: Education Regressions: Full Sample.
(1) (2) (3)
log adj price log adj price log adj price
test math 0.21734*** 0.22192*** 0.31693***
(7.79) (7.13) (7.70)
test math sq 0.03002 0.01555
(1.48) (0.76)
test math cb -0.03606**
(-2.60)
house bedrooms 0.01062 0.01502 0.01575
(1.09) (1.52) (1.62)
house bathrooms 0.14086*** 0.14413*** 0.13458***
(4.75) (4.93) (4.44)
house baths sq -0.00612 -0.00740 -0.00501
(-1.14) (-1.37) (-0.89)
house age 0.00065 0.00057 0.00123
(0.37) (0.31) (0.67)
house age sq 0.00002 0.00002 0.00002
(1.35) (1.31) (1.03)
house lotarea 0.00123*** 0.00120*** 0.00119***
(4.21) (4.27) (4.17)
house livingarea 0.45365*** 0.44475*** 0.43526***
(20.02) (17.35) (19.05)
house stories 0.39693*** 0.38775*** 0.37835***
(11.29) (10.58) (10.87)
house rooms 0.07484*** 0.07421*** 0.07245***
(10.10) (10.21) (10.11)
cenbl fem -0.00061 -0.00050 -0.00053
(-0.88) (-0.73) (-0.79)
cenbl nonwhite -0.00221*** -0.00277*** -0.00257***
(-3.62) (-5.06) (-4.57)
cenbl p5 14 -0.00017 -0.00033 -0.00021
(-0.19) (-0.38) (-0.24)
tax -0.04636 -0.04457 -0.03562
(-1.65) (-1.51) (-1.28)
cons 10.00143*** 9.99065*** 9.96337***
(59.89) (57.55) (58.13)
N 38,656 38,656 38,656
R2 0.697 0.699 0.702
Adjusted R2 0.697 0.698 0.702
t-Statistics in parentheses.
* Signiﬁcant at 10%; ** signiﬁcant at 5%; *** signiﬁcant at 1%.
24Table 4: Speciﬁcation Tests: Full Sample
Premium Model f(Y ) =  1Y +  2Y 2 +  3Y 3
Linear Quadratic Cubic
With Neighborhood Controls
Null hypothesis  1 = 0  1 =  2 = 0  1 =  2 =  3 = 0
Wald F-Statistic 60.757*** 27.686*** 30.665***
Null hypothesis  2 = 0  2 =  3 = 0
Wald F-Statistic 2.192 7.446***
Null hypothesis  3 = 0
Wald F-Statistic 6.754**
* Signiﬁcant at 10%; ** signiﬁcant at 5%; *** signiﬁcant at 1%
25Table 5: Education Regressions: Boundary Sample
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
log adj price log adj price log adj price log adj price log adj price log adj price
test math 0.06437** 0.06274*** 0.04659 0.03227* 0.03579* 0.03172
(2.58) (2.90) (1.64) (1.78) (1.93) (1.20)
test math sq 0.02656** 0.02909** 0.02209** 0.02284**
(2.47) (2.47) (2.48) (2.40)
test math cb 0.00514 0.00137
(0.73) (0.21)
house bedrooms 0.03726*** 0.03730*** 0.03749*** 0.03816*** 0.03805*** 0.03809***
(3.88) (3.89) (3.90) (4.02) (4.01) (4.00)
house bathrooms 0.10834*** 0.10785*** 0.10792*** 0.10349*** 0.10318*** 0.10320***
(5.78) (5.80) (5.82) (5.81) (5.82) (5.83)
house baths sq -0.00529* -0.00533* -0.00535* -0.00488 -0.00491 -0.00491
(-1.68) (-1.70) (-1.71) (-1.58) (-1.60) (-1.60)
house age -0.00408*** -0.00411*** -0.00412*** -0.00453*** -0.00454*** -0.00454***
(-2.73) (-2.75) (-2.76) (-3.11) (-3.13) (-3.14)
house age sq 0.00004*** 0.00004*** 0.00004*** 0.00004*** 0.00004*** 0.00004***
(2.89) (2.91) (2.92) (3.15) (3.16) (3.17)
house lotarea 0.00089** 0.00089** 0.00089** 0.00088** 0.00088** 0.00088**
(2.41) (2.41) (2.41) (2.39) (2.40) (2.39)
house livingarea 0.35315*** 0.35228*** 0.35236*** 0.34332*** 0.34297*** 0.34301***
(15.43) (15.29) (15.29) (15.52) (15.49) (15.49)
house stories 0.27574*** 0.27559*** 0.27558*** 0.26621*** 0.26625*** 0.26626***
(9.30) (9.30) (9.31) (9.55) (9.57) (9.57)
house rooms 0.05974*** 0.05952*** 0.05945*** 0.05902*** 0.05893*** 0.05891***
(7.38) (7.33) (7.31) (7.43) (7.40) (7.39)
cenbl fem -0.00044 -0.00039 -0.00039
(-0.66) (-0.59) (-0.59)
cenbl nonwhite -0.00219*** -0.00223*** -0.00222***
(-3.50) (-3.56) (-3.55)
cenbl p5 14 0.00154** 0.00153** 0.00154**
(2.25) (2.24) (2.25)
tax -0.06787*** -0.05526*** -0.05465***
(-3.21) (-2.88) (-2.73)
cons 11.13260*** 11.12998*** 11.13935*** 8.86314*** 8.72871*** 8.72454***
(32.85) (32.96) (32.97) (59.31) (62.61) (60.54)
N 10190 10190 10190 10182 10182 10182
R2 0.769 0.770 0.770 0.772 0.772 0.772
Adjusted R2 0.763 0.763 0.763 0.766 0.766 0.766
Boundary ﬁxed effects Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
t-Statistics in parentheses.
* Signiﬁcant at 10%; ** signiﬁcant at 5%; *** signiﬁcant at 1%.
26Table 6: Speciﬁcation Tests: Boundary Sample
Premium Model f(Y ) =  1Y +  2Y 2 +  3Y 3
Linear Quadratic Cubic
Without Neighborhood Controls
Null hypothesis  1 = 0  1 =  2 = 0  1 =  2 =  3 = 0
Wald F-Statistic 6.632** 4.658** 3.130**
Null hypothesis  2 = 0  2 =  3 = 0
Wald F-Statistic 6.115** 3.114**
Null hypothesis  3 = 0
Wald F-Statistic 0.527
With Neighborhood Controls
Null hypothesis  1 = 0  1 =  2 = 0  1 =  2 =  3 = 0
Wald F-Statistic 3.178* 3.581** 2.381*
Null hypothesis  2 = 0  2 =  3 = 0
Wald F-Statistic 6.166** 3.102**
Null hypothesis  3 = 0
Wald F-Statistic 0.043
* Signiﬁcant at 10%; ** signiﬁcant at 5%; *** signiﬁcant at 1%
27T
a
b
l
e
7
:
I
m
p
l
i
e
d
H
o
u
s
e
P
r
e
m
i
a
f
r
o
m
M
a
t
h
T
e
s
t
S
c
o
r
e
s
C
h
a
n
g
e
i
n
M
a
t
h
s
c
o
r
e
(
S
D
)
0
.
5
E
q
u
i
v
a
l
e
n
t
p
e
r
c
e
n
t
a
g
e
o
f
m
e
a
n
4
.
6
%
R
e
g
r
e
s
s
i
o
n
m
o
d
e
l
F
u
l
l
s
a
m
p
l
e
w
i
t
h
B
o
u
n
d
a
r
y
s
a
m
p
l
e
w
i
t
h
B
o
u
n
d
a
r
y
s
a
m
p
l
e
w
i
t
h
n
e
i
g
h
b
o
r
h
o
o
d
c
o
n
t
r
o
l
s
n
o
n
e
i
g
h
b
o
r
h
o
o
d
c
o
n
t
r
o
l
s
n
e
i
g
h
b
o
r
h
o
o
d
c
o
n
t
r
o
l
s
L
i
n
e
a
r
c
o
e
f
ﬁ
c
i
e
n
t
0
.
2
1
7
3
4
0
.
2
2
1
9
2
0
.
3
1
6
9
3
0
.
0
6
4
3
7
0
.
0
6
2
7
4
0
.
0
4
6
5
9
0
.
0
3
2
2
7
0
.
0
3
5
7
9
0
.
0
3
1
7
2
Q
u
a
d
r
a
t
i
c
c
o
e
f
ﬁ
c
i
e
n
t
–
0
.
0
3
0
0
2
0
.
0
1
5
5
5
–
0
.
0
2
6
5
6
0
.
0
2
9
0
9
–
0
.
0
2
2
0
9
0
.
0
2
2
8
4
C
u
b
i
c
c
o
e
f
ﬁ
c
i
e
n
t
–
–
-
0
.
0
3
6
0
6
–
–
0
.
0
0
5
1
4
–
–
0
.
0
0
1
3
7
C
a
s
e
1
(
M
e
a
n
s
c
o
r
e
-
1
S
D
)
P
e
r
c
e
n
t
i
n
c
r
e
a
s
e
i
n
h
o
u
s
e
p
r
i
c
e
1
0
.
8
7
8
.
8
4
1
1
.
5
3
3
.
2
2
1
.
1
5
0
.
6
0
1
.
6
1
0
.
1
3
-
0
.
0
1
D
o
l
l
a
r
v
a
l
u
e
a
t
m
e
a
n
(
f
u
l
l
s
a
m
p
l
e
)
1
6
,
0
9
2
1
3
,
0
9
7
1
7
,
0
6
6
4
,
7
6
6
1
,
6
9
6
8
8
5
2
,
3
8
9
1
9
7
-
1
1
D
o
l
l
a
r
v
a
l
u
e
a
t
m
e
a
n
(
b
o
u
n
d
a
r
y
s
a
m
p
l
e
)
1
5
,
4
3
5
1
2
,
5
6
2
1
6
,
3
6
9
4
,
5
7
1
1
,
6
2
6
8
4
9
2
,
2
9
2
1
8
9
-
1
0
C
a
s
e
2
(
M
e
a
n
s
c
o
r
e
)
P
e
r
c
e
n
t
i
n
c
r
e
a
s
e
i
n
h
o
u
s
e
p
r
i
c
e
1
0
.
8
7
1
1
.
8
5
1
5
.
7
8
3
.
2
2
3
.
8
0
3
.
1
2
1
.
6
1
2
.
3
4
2
.
1
7
D
o
l
l
a
r
v
a
l
u
e
a
t
m
e
a
n
(
f
u
l
l
s
a
m
p
l
e
)
1
6
,
0
9
2
1
7
,
5
4
2
2
3
,
3
7
4
4
,
7
6
6
5
,
6
2
9
4
,
6
2
2
2
,
3
8
9
3
,
4
6
8
3
,
2
1
9
D
o
l
l
a
r
v
a
l
u
e
a
t
m
e
a
n
(
b
o
u
n
d
a
r
y
s
a
m
p
l
e
)
1
5
,
4
3
5
1
6
,
8
2
6
2
2
,
4
1
9
4
,
5
7
1
5
,
3
9
9
4
,
4
3
3
2
,
2
9
2
3
,
3
2
6
3
,
0
8
8
C
a
s
e
2
(
M
e
a
n
s
c
o
r
e
+
1
S
D
)
P
e
r
c
e
n
t
i
n
c
r
e
a
s
e
i
n
h
o
u
s
e
p
r
i
c
e
1
0
.
8
7
1
4
.
8
5
9
.
2
3
3
.
2
2
6
.
4
6
7
.
1
9
1
.
6
1
4
.
5
5
4
.
7
7
D
o
l
l
a
r
v
a
l
u
e
a
t
m
e
a
n
(
f
u
l
l
s
a
m
p
l
e
)
1
6
,
0
9
2
2
1
,
9
8
8
1
3
,
6
6
2
4
,
7
6
6
9
,
5
6
2
1
0
,
6
4
2
2
,
3
8
9
6
,
7
3
9
7
,
0
5
8
D
o
l
l
a
r
v
a
l
u
e
a
t
m
e
a
n
(
b
o
u
n
d
a
r
y
s
a
m
p
l
e
)
1
5
,
4
3
5
2
1
,
0
9
0
1
3
,
1
0
4
4
,
5
7
1
9
,
1
7
1
1
0
,
2
0
7
2
,
2
9
2
6
,
4
6
4
6
,
7
7
0
T
h
e
p
r
e
m
i
u
m
i
s
c
o
m
p
u
t
e
d
f
r
o
m
t
h
e
l
o
g
a
r
i
t
h
m
s
p
e
c
i
ﬁ
c
a
t
i
o
n

p
=
p
=

l
n
(
p
)
=

f
(

)
,
s
o
t
h
e
p
e
r
c
e
n
t
c
h
a
n
g
e
i
n
h
o
u
s
e
p
r
i
c
e
s
i
s
g
i
v
e
n
b
y

f
(

)
=
f
(

1
)
 
f
(

0
)
a
n
d
t
h
e
p
r
e
m
i
u
m
a
t
t
h
e
m
e
a
n
p
r
i
c
e
i
s

f
(

)


p
:
28